No More Excuses! Why the Climate and Ecological Emergencies Demand a New Paradigm by Gills, B & Morgan, J
Citation:
Gills, B and Morgan, J (2021) No More Excuses! Why the Climate and Ecological Emergencies
Demand a New Paradigm. Cadmus, 4 (5). pp. 83-102. ISSN 2038-5242




Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0
The aim of the Leeds Beckett Repository is to provide open access to our research, as required by
funder policies and permitted by publishers and copyright law.
The Leeds Beckett repository holds a wide range of publications, each of which has been
checked for copyright and the relevant embargo period has been applied by the Research Services
team.
We operate on a standard take-down policy. If you are the author or publisher of an output
and you would like it removed from the repository, please contact us and we will investigate on a
case-by-case basis.
Each thesis in the repository has been cleared where necessary by the author for third party
copyright. If you would like a thesis to be removed from the repository or believe there is an issue
with copyright, please contact us on openaccess@leedsbeckett.ac.uk and we will investigate on a
case-by-case basis.
PB 83
CADMUS, Volume 4, No.5, November 2021, 83-102
No More Excuses! Why the Climate and Ecological 
Emergencies Demand a New Paradigm 
Barry K. Gills 
Editor in Chief, Globalizations;
Professor, University of Helsinki
Jamie Morgan*
Professor, Leeds Beckett University
Co-editor, Real-World Economics Review
Abstract
In this paper we reprise some of the themes set out in our recent special issue of 
Globalizations, which explores the contributing role of mainstream economics in the current 
climate emergency. We provide a brief update on the current state of the declared ‘climate 
emergency’ and we make the case for a paradigm shift informed by quite different principles, 
including ‘transversalism’.
“Gimme spots on the apples, but leave me the birds and bees…”
        – Joni Mitchell
1. Introduction 
In our view, it is strategically vital to ‘overturn’ the dominant conventional wisdom 
in the mainstream paradigm in the field of economics and to actively collaborate to create 
and propagate a radically different paradigm and deploy a new standard curriculum for 
the teaching of the field. Such a claim is not new—similar claims have been made for a 
variety of reasons in the pages of this journal (e.g. Jacobs et al., 2017). Our current claim, 
however, is more specifically motivated by the present ongoing and accelerating planetary 
crises of climate change and ecological or biophysical breakdown, involving global heating, 
species extinction, and numerous other adverse outcomes (e.g. Ripple 2021a, 2021b). This 
combination of crises compels us to make a radical departure from the existing dominant 
paradigm(s) and to actively work for the creation and realisation of a new transformative 
paradigm.
Intrinsic to this call then, is the aim to critique the dominant mainstream economics paradigm, 
to expose its function as a causal driver of the planetary crises of global climate emergency 
and ecological breakdown (Gills and Morgan, 2020a). In pursuit of this goal we have recently 
organised a project in which we invited a number of economists, other social scientists, and 
* The authors would like to confirm that they are joint and equal co-authors of this article. Some of the material is drawn from the previously published, 
Barry Gills and Jamie Morgan (2021), ‘Editorial Postscript: An End to the War on Nature: COP in or COP out?’ Globalizations, 18 (7).  
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expert activists to contribute critiques of mainstream economics and to explore associated 
issues.* There is a variety of terminology that refers to and is used to categorise mainstream 
economics and a great deal of literature which seeks to account for key characteristics of the 
field, how it develops, and for the limits to its diversity, but the core of this mainstream is often 
referred to loosely by the term neoclassical economics and typically associated currently with 
neoliberalism. While there is always scope to discuss the adequacy of concepts and there is 
a great deal of dispute regarding the meaning of terms like neoclassical and neoliberal, we 
would suggest the terms are sufficiently associated with theory and practice that have helped 
to create the world in which we live for them to stand as rough and ready reference points 
for key characteristics of contemporary theory and practice that we must move beyond if our 
species is to survive and flourish.† The following are by no means original and many will be 
familiar to interested parties in one way or another:
1. The new paradigm must embody a profoundly different understanding of what constitutes 
‘wealth creation’ and human well-being.
2. It must rethink the way needs are met through different ‘satisfiers’ operating within 
a differently conceived ‘provisioning’ system—a system that overturns the current 
tacit situation in which we live to ‘keep the economy going and growing’ rather than 
the economy exists to serve our needs. It must encourage a concept of ‘enough’ and 
distinguish consumption from consumerism and reconcile use value and exchange value.
3. It must radically alter how we conceive and how we act in regard of how we conceive 
our place in the world as a species—a metaphorical and structural switch from ‘empty 
world’ to ‘full world’ thinking, from profligate prairie ‘cowboy’ to ‘spaceship Earth’, 
from Master to steward, from ‘on’ to ‘within and with’, a form of thinking that looks to 
nurture, preserve and harmonise more than it extracts and destroys (to add yet another 
metaphor, no longer holing the boat in which we float)…   
4. It must be a paradigm that fully respects the parameters of what is necessary to live on 
this planet without destroying the basis for future social well-being, peace, and security. 
It must be a paradigm that values human well-being above gross material production. 
5. It must move beyond the contemporary dominance of capital accumulation. 
6. It must move beyond an incentive system built around bottom lines, profit at all costs, 
and corporate greed in the name of shareholder value.
7. It must break the chains of overriding corporate interest: constraints which capture 
states and policy discourse, constraints which feed and are fed by a financialized system 
in which money comes from debt, and finance acts as inequality-enhancing, bubble-
forming, asset-expanding fuel for, rather than lubricant of the economy. 
* The list of included contributions in the special issue volume 18 issue 7, 2021 of Globalizations includes (in order and as dated from online publication): 
Gills and Morgan (2020b); Spash (2020a); Hickel (2020a); Trainer (2021); Galbraith (2020); Spash (2020b); Keen (2020); Asefi-Najafabady et al. (2020); 
Gills and Morgan (2020c); Bacevic (2020); Koch and Buch-Hansen (2020); Dale (2020); Fox and Alldred (2020); Goodman and Anderson (2020); Egmose 
et al. (2021); Franco and Borras Jr. (2021) and Steffen and Morgan (2021).
† For those interested in debates regarding adequacy of concepts and their relevance see e.g., Venugopal (2015); Bruff and Tansel (2019); Jessop and 
Morgan (2021).  
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8. It must move beyond the centrality of economic growth and the conventional 
measurement of GDP, and embrace post-growth, degrowth, and social-ecological 
economics perspectives. 
These are not substantive elements of a curriculum or of how it should be taught, but 
rather orienting issues and principles. For a mainstream economist much of this will seem 
beside the point, cosmic, utopian, someone else’s problem—but that is precisely part of 
the problem. Economics has become a universal toolkit, behind which sits a framework of 
theory and attitudes which constitute ‘thinking like an economist’. This has involved implicit 
values and policy preferences and a whole set of omissions and commissions with adverse 
consequences—not least economics’ role in facilitating our descent into climate emergency. 
And yet mainstream economics has little time for discussion of values or of its own role in 
the world because its concept of science has undermined the capacity of economists to reflect 
and work with norms and with power—these are shunned as ‘ideological’, as ‘distortions’ of 
a fact-focused science. But as the list above indicates (if one pays attention to its contrasted 
claims) and as readers are perhaps aware—mainstream economics is built around the theory 
of the circular flow of income and measuring exchange values in a pricing system (the 
aggregate of which is GDP) and material consequences and processes play little to no direct 
role in its theory and thus in its policy relevance. Consider what that means, the dominant 
theory-form and the most influential source of social science policy on the planet has no 
foundational regard for the planet—this is merely subsumed in pricing processes or tagged 
on via environmental economics. 
As such, mainstream economics is a theory of the most material aspect of human activity 
(the economy) with no binding measurement of what an economy really is and really does. 
This raises deep questions regarding mainstream economics status as a fact-focused science, 
since this is the equivalent of cosmology having no interest in gravity. From this point of 
view economics has become the  most aberrant of contemporary social sciences and this too 
demands a paradigm shift, but one which some social theorists suggest speaks to a problem 
across the social sciences. Andrew Sayer puts this best:
It seems that becoming a social scientist involves learning to adopt this 
distanced relation to social life, perhaps so as to be more objective as if we 
could be more objective by ignoring part of the object… Values and objectivity 
need not be inversely related. For many social scientists, assessing well-being 
“Mainstream economics has little time for discussion of values 
or of its own role in the world because its concept of science has 
undermined the capacity of economists to reflect and work with 
norms and with power – these are shunned as ‘ideological’, as 
‘distortions’ of a fact focused science.”
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is a step too far, a dangerous importation of the researcher’s own values. But 
well-being and ill-being are indeed states of being, not merely subjective value-
judgments… The very assumption that judgments of value and objectivity don’t  
mix—an assumption that is sometimes built into the definition of  
“objectivity”—is a misconception… How people can live together is not merely 
a matter of coordination of the actions of different individuals by means of 
conventions, like deciding which side of the road to drive on, but a matter of 
considering people’s capacities for flourishing and susceptibilities to harm and 
suffering… I have often encountered the strange idea that values are not only 
subjective but synonymous with “bias” or distortion. It is further assumed that 
they are personal biases that one ideally should confess to, so that others will 
at least be able to “take them into account”, that is, discount them… As social 
scientific spectators we tend to talk about behaviour in terms of what explains it, 
usually by reference to existing circumstances and meanings, but as participants, 
we tend to justify what we do, and implicitly invite others to accept or reject our 
justification. (Sayer, 2011: 6-11)
Sayer’s point is that social science needs to reconcile a whole set of false binaries and 
remember what the point of social science is—to help others think about what it means for 
our species to flourish not merely to measure a set of metrics and state a set of regularities that 
constitute what it is that we currently do. As such we would also add to our list in the light of 
climate and ecological breakdown:
9. The idea of progress must be philosophically and culturally redefined to embody post-
materialistic aspirations and meaning as primary for human flourishing. 
And because climate and ecological breakdown are global problems:
10. The new paradigm must create a workable framework to ensure future peace and security 
for all of humanity and the perpetuation of the ecosystems and myriad other species 
upon which human life depends. 
Our claim then is that we need a new paradigm that connects all aspects of systems 
and understands that objectivity is not impartiality. Reality is not just interesting: we have 
an interest in reality and what we value manifestly affects both the planet and ourselves. 
At the moment that interest extends to an existential imperative—creating a paradigm of 
social transformation that guarantees a human future not condemned to perpetual acute 
crises of environmental and social breakdown and collapse. As we have already noted, this 
“The new paradigm must create a workable framework to ensure 
future peace and security for all of humanity and the perpetuation 
of the ecosystems and myriad other species upon which human 
life depends.”
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new paradigm should reflect whole systems thinking, respect the insights and empirical 
information derived from contemporary Earth system science, and definitively abandon the 
false dichotomies of the separation of politics from economics and humanity from ‘nature’ 
(Biermann, 2021). There is no scope here to discuss all aspects of this subject, so in what 
follows we will provide some flavour of our thinking, and would urge you to read the collected 
essays and the sources they draw on. We begin with a review of the significance of recent 
climate science and why it compels us to renew our call for urgent radical transformative 
action and end with a discussion of ‘transversalism’ (Gills and Morgan, 2020a; Gills, 2020; 
Gills and Hosseini, 2021).
2. The consequences of complacency and delay: what once was a problem 
for the future has become an urgent problem for the now 
As the classic hockey stick graph of GDP highlights, the first industrial revolution 
radically changed economic output and this industrialisation created a whole new order 
of resource and carbon-dependent energy use, beginning with coal (see Newell, 2021). 
Subsequent industrial revolutions (electrical, chemical, digital) built upon this; as economies 
developed, they also diversified and through various socio-economic processes developed 
consumerism as a key component of the economy—creating a mutually dependent source 
of growth, identity, and aspiration. This resource and energy-hungry complex has gradually 
spread from place to place, and especially so in the last 50 years. However one historicizes 
contemporary ‘globalization’, there are more of us and more of us living lives of a kind we 
did not before or servicing those who do, since only a fraction of the world’s population 
experience the kind of lifestyles that the spread of industrialisation and consumption offers 
as its aspirational ideal. 
It is entirely explicable then that this ‘great acceleration’ (McNeill, 2001) has massively 
increased the demands we place on the planet—such that our species and its dominant system 
now define a post-Holocene epoch (the Anthropocene for some, the ‘capitalocene’ for others—
see Moore, 2015). The cumulative consequences have been sufficiently obvious through the 
last 50 years to induce various organisations to address those consequences: the UNEP in 
1972, the various UN Earth Summits since 1992 (following the creation of Earth Day in 1970 
and also the work of the UN World Commission in 1987 on ‘sustainable development’) and, 
of course, the UNFCCC in 1992 and the subsequent Conference Of the Parties (COP) process 
to address climate change—of which COP26 in Glasgow is the latest in 2021. Across this 
period a contrast has developed between the adverse consequences of ‘business as usual’ and 
a different more viable way forward, and yet throughout there have been numerous state and 
corporate-led attempts to prevent significant change across numerous fronts (Oreskes and 
Conway, 2010; Lamb et al., 2020): questioning the science, questioning the need for urgent 
action, counselling delay, arguing that problems will essentially take care of themselves (as 
company investment and consumer behaviour adjust) with some minor steering from global 
organization and individual governments. 
As our special issue of Globalizations makes clear, mainstream economics has been part 
of this problem rather than a source of solutions. Delay has continued sufficiently long now 
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for a problem for the future to become an urgent problem for the now, and this is across 
multiple fronts. The UNEP, COP etc. notwithstanding, it used to be considered ‘alarmist’ 
to refer to ‘business as usual’ as an existential problem, but this is no longer the case and 
reference to the potential for a ‘mass extinction’ event and ‘civilizational collapse’ by the 
end of this century if we do not act commensurate to the problems that now are beginning to 
manifest has become common media currency (for the background on biodiversity loss and 
a sixth mass extinction see Bradshaw et al., 2021).  
Most Earth systems operate according to multi-faceted interactions of parts in a system, where 
that system has emergent properties that endure for very long periods. This is ‘complexity’ 
as a rough tendency for reproduction or stabilisation of some complicated process—weather 
patterns and parameters within climate systems etc.—and this is dependent on a balance 
between positive feedback processes (self-augmenting changes) and negative feedback 
(self-dampening changes). Human intervention can disrupt these processes in numerous 
ways—adding or extracting chemicals, removing species, modifying land and seascapes—
leading to a combination of anthropogenic ‘forcing’ factors, destructions and disruptions. 
The more pervasive we become the more our impact is felt, the longer our activity continues 
the greater the cumulative consequence and the more possibility of a breakdown of systems 
and also transition of states of systems—and this is very important since the Holocene was 
an unusually benign period over the last 12,000 years or so. Consider then:
• In 1900 the world’s population was about 1.6 billion and global GDP was estimated at 
$1.1 trillion, while in 2020 global population approached 7.8 billion and GDP stood 
at about $85 trillion (a reduction from over $87 trillion in 2019 due to the effects of 
COVID-19). 
• According to a special report from the IPCC, 70% of ice-free land surface is now directly 
affected by human use (IPCC, 2019).
• Our rate of resource use has already exceeded the regenerative capacity of the Earth 
(Earth ‘overshoot’ day was July 29th in 2021, two months earlier than twenty years 
previously and our current activity requires more than 1.7 Earths in this context).* 
• Volume atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration has increased from an average 
280 parts per million (ppm) at the beginning of the industrial revolution to 417ppm in 
2021 (approaching levels not seen in 3.6 million years). It took around 200 years for the 
280ppm figure to increase by around 25% but just the last 30 years for it to increase by 
about 50%. 
• According to research sponsored by Oxfam, the current situation of resource exhaustion 
and climate emergency reflects deep inequalities. Between 1995 and 2015: ‘The richest 
10% of the world’s population (c.630 million people) were responsible for 52% of the 
cumulative carbon emissions—depleting the global carbon budget by nearly a third 
(31%) in those 25 years alone; The poorest 50% (c.3.1 billion people) were responsible 
* Note there is some dispute regarding the modelling of data for this metric but most of the criticism tends to argue that the approach underestimates rather 
than overestimates the problem.
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for just 7% of cumulative emissions, and used just 4% of the available carbon budget; 
The richest 1% (c.63 million people) alone were responsible for 15% of cumulative 
emissions, and 9% of the carbon budget—twice as much as the poorest half of the 
world’s population’ (Gore, 2020: 2).
 There are numerous similar statistics covering a whole array of related aspects of life 
on Earth. In any case, we have in recent years witnessed an intensification and acceleration 
of the conjoint crises of global climate change and ecological breakdown or ‘biosphere 
degradation’. According to work by Earth system scientists, over the last two decades or 
so the ‘safe operating space’ of  3, then 4, and now likely 6 out of 9 components of Earth 
systems have  been transgressed, of which the best known is the climate system and the 
effects of greenhouse gases (Steffen and Morgan, 2021).* 
3. Climate Emergency Update
A main focus of climate science is the relation between carbon emissions and changes in 
average global surface temperature and this is typically defined using ‘climate sensitivity’, 
i.e. the increase in temperature per doubling of atmospheric CO2 (from the preindustrial 
benchmark of 280ppm to 560ppm). The Earth is an ‘open system’ of conditional relations 
between many parts so the resultant level of heating is contingent—until recently estimates 
usually placed this between 1.5 0C to 4.5 0C per doubling, but more recent consensus raises 
and narrows this to the lower decimal end of 2 0C and upper decimal end of 3 0C as processes 
feed through systems and the derivation of this and the upper bound is now hotly debated 
in climate science, insofar as the effects may be even higher (see Sherwood et al., 2020). 
Temperature has already increased by 1.1 0C-1.3 0C depending on measure and dataset used, 
and to be clear, this is average temperature not weather—average temperature affects climate 
systems and thus weather patterns, in turn affecting the range of temperatures, levels of water 
vapour, cloud cover and thus further processes, such as patterns and intensity of rainfall and 
wind speeds. This then feeds through other processes—carbon capture by forests varying 
by growing season, ocean absorption etc. and it should be noted that emissions occurring 
now can take hundreds and thousands of years to work their way through—even if we 
stopped emitting now the processes of heating set in train will continue based on cumulative 
emissions. According to the IPCC:
A large fraction of anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO2 emissions 
is irreversible on a multi-century to millennial time scale, except in the case of a 
large net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere over a sustained period. Surface 
temperatures will remain approximately constant at elevated levels for many 
centuries after a complete cessation of net anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Due to 
the long time scales of heat transfer from the ocean surface to depth, ocean warming 
will continue for centuries. Depending on the scenario, about 15 to 40% of emitted 
CO2 will remain in the atmosphere longer than 1,000 years. (IPCC, 2014: 28) 
* The Kyoto Protocol defined the GHGs as: Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), Hydro-fluorocarbons (HFC), Perfluorocarbons 
(PFC), Nitrogen Trifluoride (NF3) and Sulphur Hexafluoride (SF6).
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Some Earth system scientists have placed the threshold for ‘safe operating space’ at 
350ppm and we are already well past that, but it is because observed effects at lower rises of 
temperature have been greater than initially thought and anticipated effects as temperatures 
rise are expected to be more extreme, that the Paris Agreement, negotiated in 2015 at COP21, 
aimed to restrict global heating to less than 2 0C with an aim of 1.5 0C. The IPCC is a UN 
mandated organization founded in 1988, and it collates climate science. It operates in cycles 
and forms working groups whose combined work is published at the end of the cycle as a 
synthesis report (we are in the sixth cycle and AR6 is due in 2022). It was mainly based on 
the IPCC Global Warming of 1.5 0C special report that governments acknowledged the need 
for greater urgency in achieving emission reductions and began to focus on the high profile 
goals of a 45% reduction on 2010 levels by 2030 and ‘net-zero’ by mid-century (IPCC, 2018: 
12). The situation however continues to deteriorate in a number of ways.
Myriad actors have rhetorically taken on board the need to plan to decarbonise more 
rapidly with the aim of achieving ‘net-zero’ status. But much of this lacks effective concrete 
plans or clear implementable policy—in most cases governments are at the first step rather 
than having taken it—though hopefully COP26 in Glasgow November 2021 will signal some 
further progress. However, even the assessment of the nature of ‘net’ is in question insofar as 
many plans depend on smooth transition to use of technologies untested at scale and in some 
cases not yet existent in their anticipated form (see next section and Dyke et al., 2021; Lewis, 
2021). There is much legitimate concern (especially in civil society) that ‘net-zero’ by mid-
century is but another tactic of delay and deferral that in practice allows governments and 
corporate entities to continue with practices that perpetuate the present patterns of pollution 
and ecological degradation and destruction as if there were no real Emergency. If one looks 
to the ‘Nationally Determined Contributions’ (NDCs) of states, other aspects of government 
policy (creation of a new ‘social infrastructure’ addressing change to heating systems 
and housing standards, dependence on fossil fuel energy, transport systems, aviation, and 
shipping conformity, standards and goals for industry, digital service emissions etc.) in terms 
of real actions, as well as the actual activity (rather than statements of intent) by major global 
corporations and banks, aimed to produce  radical and immediate greenhouse gas emissions 
cuts, then these remain woefully inadequate to prevent potentially catastrophic scenarios 
from becoming a future reality.  
China is a major focus of concern. It may be the case that emissions have a strong correlation 
with inequality and that the majority of emissions have historically been accounted for by 
the longstanding industrialised countries and by a few corporations and so on. It may also be 
the case that ‘just transitions’ are a key issue, but unless emissions start to fall everywhere 
these problems become moot—and this means the major emitters today must begin to act 
now since the planet does not care about how we apportion ‘historic emissions’. Richard 
Smith points out that China is more than simply the place wealthy nations outsource their 
emissions to through offshoring in globalized supply chains. It has its own internal drivers of 
climate profligacy and by various measures its share of emissions is disproportionate (based 
on the size of its population, its GDP, and GDP per capita). Moreover, its emissions continue 
to grow.
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For more than a century the US was the world’s largest CO2 emitter by far. But its 
emissions declined from their peak of 7,370 million Mt CO2e (metric tons of CO2 equivalent) 
in 2007 to 6,457 million Mt CO2e in 2017, reflecting the ongoing replacement of coal-fired 
power plants with solar, wind and lower-emissions natural gas energy sources. The emissions 
of the European Union countries have also trended downward over the past three decades, 
from 5,654 million Mt CO2e in 1990 to 4,206 million Mt CO2e in 2017. To be sure, these 
declines are far from sufficient to reverse global warming—they aren’t even enough to meet 
their commitments to the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change—but at least they were 
declines. By contrast, China’s carbon emissions have relentlessly grown, quadrupling from 
3,265 million Mt CO2e in 1990 to 13,442 Mt CO2e in 2018… [Though China is the world’s 
biggest investor in and producer of renewable technologies across economic sectors it 
continues to build coal power production facilities and capacity] China isn’t replacing fossil 
fuels with renewables so much as building more capacity of both. (Smith, 2020: xiv) In just 
twelve years from 2005 to 2017, China’s CO2 emissions nearly doubled again to more than 
twice those of the US. Yet China’s GDP was only 63% as large as the US GDP in 2017… 
[While] Per capita CO2 emissions surged past those of the EU six years ago and are now half 
those of the US (7.45 Mt CO2e vs. 15.56 Mt CO2e in 2018). Yet China’s per capita GDP was 
just 15 percent that of the US in 2018 ($9,627 vs. $62,904) [and its population was just 68% 
of the five other top emitters]. (Smith, 2020: xiii & vii). 
The point here is not to single China out in some malign sense, but to illustrate the 
urgency of the problem and to highlight a basic shared issue that countries and corporations 
have different reasons (and continue to different degrees) to try to square a circle that seems 
impossible to square. China is committed to maintaining economic growth of around 6.5% per 
year and is still building coal-powered power stations. And despite the IEA stating a need to 
stop the search for new fossil fuel sources, most countries in the world have continued to do so. 
In the meantime, emissions continue to rise across the world albeit at a slower rate, and 
trends remain adverse despite the temporary dip in emissions that resulted from the 
COVID-19 global pandemic in 2020. The UNEP publishes periodic emissions gap reports 
and the latest (the eleventh) in 2020 reveals yet another set of dire statistics for current and 
projected greenhouse gas emissions—record levels in every category of measurement, for 
example, 38Gt CO2 from fossil fuels in 2019 (UNEP, 2020). We are already witnessing more 
frequent and intense ‘extreme weather events’ all around the globe: widespread forest fires, 
more intense hurricanes, extended droughts, and sudden deluges resulting in flooding. Much 
of this is occurring earlier than expected and this too speaks to growing concerns expressed 
by climate and Earth systems scientists. There are inherent limitations in attempting to 
model complex systems based on multiple interacting and dependent aspects, and reasonably 
well-understood relations and processes can still deliver surprises and are subject to basic 
uncertainty. As longstanding IPCC contributor and one of the originators of the planetary 
boundary approach to Earth systems (and one of the early proponents of the Anthropocene 
concept), Will Steffen, puts it:  
We know, with a high degree of certainty, that many positive feedback processes 
exist, but we don’t know—with a high degree of certainty—where the tipping 
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points for these processes might lie. That is, where is the level of forcing (e.g., 
temperature rise) beyond which permafrost melt becomes self-reinforcing and 
thus unstoppable? Even more uncertainty surrounds the interactions among these 
feedback processes, interactions that could lead to a global tipping cascade. In 
effect, this is the process that would drive the Earth System from one stable 
state—the Holocene—into another stable, but much hotter, state, sometimes 
called ‘Hothouse Earth’.  Large uncertainties remain regarding the point at which 
such a global tipping cascade, if it exists, could be initiated (Steffen and Morgan, 
2021).
A recent paper in Earth System Dynamics highlights this problem of uncertain ‘domino 
effects’ and problems of sudden runaway irreversible changes (Wunderling et al., 2021). 
The underlying point such science alludes to is that even the best science we have can be 
underestimating the problem and that problems might begin to manifest earlier than expected 
and there is some evidence that we are beginning to see that now. For example, temperature 
variation at both poles have been much wider (and temperatures far higher) than in recent 
history and the rate of melting of ice sheets has accelerated, while the rate at which ice 
shelves in the West Antarctic impede this has slowed due to fragmentation of sheets rather 
than a slower effect from just gradual melting (Joughin et al., 2021).
The situation then, hangs in the balance and a recent well-publicised report from IPCC 
Working Group 1 (‘physical science’) highlights this (IPCC, 2021). The report provides 
detailed measurements of the actual extent of greenhouse gas emissions and unfolding global 
climate patterns. According to the report, ‘low likelihood’ but potentially high impact or 
‘extreme events’, including the possibility of ‘abrupt responses and tipping points of the 
climate system’ are now becoming more likely as global heating continues. This includes 
processes such as Antarctic ice sheet melt, forest dieback, and the (ongoing) slowing of the 
Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) oceanic flow (the conveyor which 
brings warm waters north in the Atlantic, popularly known as the Gulf Stream). Among the 
further consequences are continued trends of ocean acidification, and sea-level rise, which 
will be ‘irreversible for centuries’. According to the report, humanity is currently on course 
for the IPCC ‘intermediate’ and ‘high’ emissions scenarios, which could produce heating of 
2.7 0C to 3.6 0C by 2100. Moreover, the report makes it very clear that in all 5 of its scenarios, 
within the next two decades it is now likely that global warming reaches or exceeds the 1.5 0C 
goal of the Paris Agreement, regardless of how radically governments and corporations now 
cut greenhouse gas emissions, moreover it may do so earlier than previously expected (up to 
twenty years earlier when compared to the IPCC special report of 2018).*  
The authors of the special report, however, make every effort not to convey the impression 
that our situation is irredeemable. According to the report the ‘good news’ is that, in the 
most ambitious low emissions scenario, the global climate might eventually (re)stabilise after 
* The expectation is that 1.5 0C will be reached by 2040 at latest compared to 2052 previously but the band overlap allows for 20 years; and the report 
begins from a current averaged heating figure of 1.09 0C, which as some of the previous material indicates, is less than some datasets (placing it at 1.2 0C 
to 1.3 0C).  
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some 20 years, and global heating could fall back to 1.4 0C by 2100—commensurate to Paris 
goals. This is a highly optimistic account of scenario pathways that assumes immediate and 
effective actions to achieve ‘net-zero’ through more ambitious NDCs, major changes to land 
management, significant emission reductions across all aspects of society and economy, and 
with an additional role for carbon capture and also potential atmospheric carbon removal 
i.e., ‘negative emissions’. To put this in context, depending on the measurement category, 
humanity emits around 40 billion tonnes of CO2 per annum into the atmosphere. Under the 
‘very low’ emissions scenario that will need to fall to 5 tonnes per annum by 2050. As Ed 
Hawkins, one of the authors of the IPCC report states, ‘Every bit of warming matters… 
Every tonne of CO2 matters.’
*
The ‘good news’, furthermore, has additional context. With assistance from members of 
Scientist Rebellion a leaked report has emerged from sources within IPCC Working Group 
3 (CTXT, 2021).† This is the group responsible for analysis of how to reduce emissions and 
mitigate impacts. Their final report is not due to be published until March 2022, long after 
vital decisions have been made at COP26 and this seems to have motivated a breaking of 
ranks. According to the leaked report, emissions must peak globally before 2025 and reach 
net-zero between 2050 and 2075. Concomitantly, no new coal or gas-fired plants should be 
built and existing ones should be wound down before their normal time of decommissioning, 
growth in global consumption of energy must reduce and there must also be a ‘massive 
transition in the consumption of materials around the world’ i.e. a reduction in a whole 
array of processes that produce emissions over and above the energy sector (CTXT, 2021). 
The report represents yet another ramping up of calls for urgent and immediate action and 
the significance of this leaked report is not only scientific but also political, given there is 
a clear sense that the leak was provoked by concern among some of the scientists involved 
that their findings and urgent warnings would be watered down through the intervention of 
governments in the complex processes of approval of IPCC reports before final publication. 
They did not want to risk that, and so they sought to ensure that their actual findings could be 
discussed globally prior to COP26.
So, as new data has emerged, scientific warnings have grown ever more urgent and there 
has been a recent trend for observed effects to tend to the severe end of possibilities i.e. worst-
cases—and this is despite some consensus that climate sensitivity might be within a narrower 
band than 1.5 0C to 4.5 0C per doubling of CO2, but partly accepting a continual problem 
of underestimating of effects in modelling systems and underlying problems of uncertainty 
regarding where exactly self-reinforcing transitions might lie. 
4. Social Redesign, Redistribution, and Doing Less versus Technofixes 
and Technocratic Desperation?         
We seem to have reached a political crossroads as much as a climate one. Until recently it 
was not uncommon for climate activists to ask, ‘what will it take to make enough people, and 
* Ed Hawkins, Reading University, UK, cited in New Scientist, 9 August, 2021 ‘Earth will hit 1.50C climate limit within 20 years, says IPCC Report’.
† See: https://scientistrebellion.com 
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enough people in places where power centres reside, sit up and take notice?’ We now seem to 
have reached that point. In the last few months there has been virtually no corner of the world 
that has not reported an extreme weather event that has required a disaster response. And these 
seem to be coming thick and fast now. For example, in early September 2021 the Washington 
Post conducted an analysis and found that nearly a third of Americans lived in a county within 
an area where the federal government had declared a disaster in the previous three months 
and two-thirds lived in a county that had suffered a dangerous heatwave (Charter, 2021). 
A simple Google search quickly throws up similar events elsewhere, all in July—Angela 
Merkel’s shocked face as she confronts destruction from flash flooding in Germany, terrible 
pictures of commuters trapped in a flooded underground rail service in Zhengzhou, Henan 
Province in China, a rare high-pressure heat dome effect in Canada producing temperatures 
of nearly 50 0C (in a country whose previous and recent record temperature was 45 0C) etc. * 
Flooding and outright destruction of homes, interruption to taken-for-granted basic 
services such as electricity, sanitation, and transport, and various other observable impacts 
mean the consequences of disaster (not just minor inconvenience) are being  felt  in more 
places and thought about everywhere. It is surely beginning to dawn on people in a visceral 
way that climate and ecological breakdown are a threat to social cohesion and it is surely 
starting to occur to more people than in the past that if this is happening at current temperatures 
then it can only get worse as temperatures rise… As such, populations are now becoming 
more receptive to policy change to address these problems (with some likely friction created 
by demagogues like Trump or Bolsonaro) and this receptivity seems set to grow.† 
The question, of course, is ‘what to do?’ and here governments face a basic decision 
regarding how to frame responses. At the moment there is a strong ‘technofix’ and technocratic 
dimension to policy framing. ‘Technofix’ does not mean the use of technology—clearly, any 
response to climate and ecological breakdown will involve technological change.‡ ‘Technofix’ 
means presenting technology as the solution to a problem and while in real policy circles it 
rarely rises to the status of the only solution there is a typical tendency to place primary focus 
on technology. As we previously noted a dominant focus on technology tends to gloss over 
a whole host of issues and the list of issues can be extensive: whether a technology currently 
exists, whether it is possible in principle, whether it can be scaled, whether resources (real 
and financial) can be organised to expedite it, whether it can be commercialised, and whether 
any and all of these apply within relevant timelines. And behind these sits also the temptation 
to proffer technological fixes because these offer the scope for apparent solutions that change 
the means by which we do things but have less impact on what we do and thus the drivers 
of the system in which we do those things. This readily becomes a line-of-least-resistance 
approach to policy—selling the public on the idea that fundamental changes to society 
are less necessary and perhaps unnecessary. However, given the whole array of risks and 
uncertainty  associated with technology, the problem of timelines and urgency, and the fact 
that technofixes do not address the underlying sources (drivers of energy and resource use 
* BBC report of Merkel’s response: https://youtu.be/faXSsw76C9A  Henan flooding reports: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-57861067 
† See, for example, the recent University of Bath 10 country youth survey of climate fears: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-58549373 
‡ For an interesting survey of innovations see the BBC podcast series, ‘39 Ways to Save the Planet’: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m000qwt3 
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built around economic growth and the vested interests of powerful groupings liable to create 
delay) of climate and ecological breakdown, then such an approach seems reckless at best. 
There are, of course, different arguments—whether growth is an inherent aspect of 
capitalism, whether economic growth can be sufficiently ‘decoupled’ from climate effects 
to allow a growth system to be viable, whether it is best to focus piecemeal on reducing 
emissions and resource use and just not worry about economic growth as a metric—and 
these can be claims about theory (is something impossible in principle?) or can be more 
empirical (what does the evidence currently suggest?). We would argue (and this is basic to 
the essays in the special issue of Globalizations) that both theory and evidence are on the side 
of reducing the size of economies in aggregate. We would argue that this requires different 
ways of thinking about the nature of economic systems, what drives them and how they 
‘provision’. Moreover, in the absence of full certainty this would also seem to be the rational 
prudential response to the urgency of our situation. Technofixes place confidence in things 
that may not be possible in various senses of that word. However, as a species we can control 
the conventions by which we live since these are a matter of how we organise and what 
we choose collectively to do. In this sense social redesign is more realistic and achievable 
than technofixes (though opinions differ, contrast the critiques of growth by Keyber and 
Lenzen, 2021; Hickel and Kallis, 2020; Parrique et al., 2019; and the recent techno-optimist 
behavioural analysis from Tony Blair’s think tank, Meyer and Lord, 2021). 
Consider, for example, the range of changes the 2021 Working Group 1 IPCC report we 
previously referred to suggests. Quite a bit of this (in addition to land use changes) turns 
on technologies—some of them more advanced in development than others, but all invite 
basic questions regarding feasibility and advisability. At the extreme are negative emissions 
technologies. Iceland is perhaps most advanced in establishing proof of principle for these 
technologies. Climeworks’ ‘Orca’ plant has just been completed there and it comprises a 
huge fan system running on Iceland’s abundant geothermal (renewable) energy that sucks 
surrounding air through filters that extract CO2. Once the filters are saturated, they are heated 
to release the CO2 into water which is then pumped into underground caverns where the 
carbon reacts with basalt and up to 90% of the CO2 is mineralised within 2 years. The plant 
has a capacity of around 4,000 tonnes of CO2 a year, a meaningless amount in terms of current 
emissions levels but sufficient for the IPCC report to mention the technology and there are 
several variations on this theme now in development around the world.* One might describe 
this as an ingenious technological marvel, but equally it might be viewed as the desperate 
last gasp of a moribund system. The order-of-magnitude difference between capacity and 
the reality of emissions makes these technologies marginal at best and their existence cannot 
‘dematerialise’ an economy.           
The problem with technofixes (rather than technology per se) is that its framing of 
technology becomes a distraction and source of complacency—even if well-meaning and 
* Note, while these atmospheric negative emissions technologies are relatively new, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) have been an 
assumed component of net changes to emissions since at least IPCC AR5 (whose primary concerns predate the 1.50C goal of Paris and which assumes a 
growing role for this and forestation over the second half of the century based mainly on a 20C target). Work questioning the feasibility of this modelling 
(itself using fairly dubious integrated assessment models) is longstanding. (See, for example, van Vuuren et al., 2018).   
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even if there are plenty of people urging us to keep new technology in perspective. There 
is a tendency to think solutions are in hand and one might argue that it takes a great deal 
of socialisation to persuade us that technology is a more realistic escape route than social 
redesign—it requires us to have an oddly disempowered sense of what we could control and 
what we are able to decide to do. This brings us to the technocratic dimension of current policy. 
Few readers will need persuading that we live in societies with a complex division of labour 
that has exhibited a general tendency for capture of authority and control of decision-making. 
The curious thing about this in the modern era is that ‘neoliberalism’ has combined this with 
marketisation. We tend to accept that market processes can solve problems as unintended 
consequences of processes of profit-making etc. and we tend to accept that society is complex 
and that it is experts in given fields who should make primary decisions about what is done 
and how—economics of course has been a primary site for these changes. 
Technofixes become more attractive if one has a technocratic mindset, and yet even 
technocratic responses require buy-in by citizens. Citizens, for example, are required 
to adopt market psychologies and make ‘investments’ to ensure technological changes 
happen—electric cars, hydrogen heating systems, new insulation for homes etc.—in order 
for technology to be mirrored by behaviour. But this has self-limiting potential since it 
invites citizens to treat collective existential threats as individual consumer decisions. More 
fundamentally it socialises people to think less about the norms by which they live and 
to expect to have less scope to deliberate and participate in decisions about society. The 
problems this has caused, of course, do not relate only to climate and ecological crisis—they 
are relevant to a host of issues regarding the crisis of democracy (polarisation, cynicism, 
sense of disenfranchisement etc.) that has erupted, but for our purposes, the combination 
of disempowerments is extremely problematic since from a climate and ecological point of 
view, it is the system itself that is in question.  
One might argue then that the system itself makes thinking about living differently 
problematic even if the problems of that system seem to require us to do so. ‘Problematic’, 
however, does not mean impossible (and see conclusion).  Recognition that more fundamental 
change is needed is growing and has numerous sources. Physicists, climatologists, Earth 
system scientists etc. are rarely by inclination radicals and have over the years (with a 
few notable exceptions) tended to be reticent about organising and campaigning (perhaps 
concerned that this would harm scientific credibility). But the situation is now dire enough 
for the scientific community in the guise of groups like The Alliance of World Scientists to 
take a leading role in declaring climate emergency and in making the case for radical and 
urgent action (see Ripple et al., 2021a, 2021b). Social movements creating pressure from 
below are also on the rise and demonstrations, dissent and disobedience are occurring around 
the world. Many events are currently (at time of writing) planned to create pressure in the 
run-up to COP26—for example, the ‘Fridays for Future’ global climate strike held on 24th 
September 2021, and the latest ‘Global Day of Action’ held on November 6th.*  General 
activist groups such as Extinction Rebellion can now be found in many parts of the globe, as 
* Visit: https://fridaysforfuture.org; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Day_of_Action; https://takeclimateaction.uk/get-involved/global-day-action-6-
november-2021 
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can sector-specific groups such as the aviation campaigning organisation, ‘stay grounded’.* 
These movements can be expected to grow in the coming decade, and depending on the 
decisions made and actions implemented by governments, corporations, and banks, may 
potentially become even more radical in their tactics and their demands. In any case, such 
calls for ‘system change’ imply the existing social order is open to question (Gills, 2020). 
It should also be noted that officials, governments and groups like the IPCC have begun to 
make statements or offer analysis that endorses reducing the scale and intensity of economies, 
and recognise the importance of ‘just transitions’—albeit inconsistently. The leaked Working 
Group 3 report from the IPCC, for example, states, ‘In scenarios that contemplate a reduction 
in energy demand, mitigation challenges are significantly reduced, with less dependence on 
CO2 removal (CDR), less pressure on land and lower prices of carbon. These scenarios do 
not suppose a decrease in well-being, but rather a provision of better services’ (CTXT, 2021). 
The report also suggests it is possible to address extreme poverty around the world without 
exacerbating the global heating crisis—given that ‘the largest emitters are the richest’ and 
the richest 10% emit ten times more than the poorest 10%’ (CTXT, 2021). As such, the 
report resonates with some aspects of degrowth, postgrowth and social ecological economics 
and we would argue that there is great scope for development along these lines to combat 
misunderstandings regarding what these entail (see Spash and Guisan, 2021; Hickel, 2020b; 
O’Neill, 2018; Liegey and Nelson, 2020; Kallis, 2018; Demaria et al., 2013). 
There is a great deal more that could be said here, but space precludes further discussion. 
Suffice to say, and in regard of the ‘crossroads’ we find ourselves at, we would argue 
that we should turn towards doing less… we need a concept of ‘enough’, of ‘sufficiency’ 
and ‘sufficient development’, and these concepts need careful elaboration. In the current 
environment, people confuse degrowth, post-growth and socio-ecological economics with 
their experience of uncontrolled collapse, recession etc.—situations of rising unemployment, 
falling incomes, individual suffering, and systemic pressure. Degrowth, however, is not 
this—it is in fact an attempt to prevent a future climate-induced version of this problem via 
a managed transition that redirects resources in smaller economies to meet needs through 
different sets of ‘satisfiers’ (allowing for smaller working populations, universal basic 
income, and universal basic welfare services, more focus of resources on meeting primary 
care needs, and a decisive shift away from economies built around designed obsolescence, 
conspicuous and superfluous consumption and waste creation). 
Moreover, this approach to ‘enough’ is not about preserving the privilege of some 
wealthy parts of the world by denying development to others. It rather extends concepts of 
justice and redistribution to planetary scales precisely in order to avoid the all too foreseeable 
consequences of global climate emergency and ecological breakdown: an intensification 
of trends we are already beginning to see, such as fractious conflict as global North states 
compete for diminishing resources and to control borders as mass migration increases to 
escape the immediate effects of insecurity (see, for example, Quiggin et al., 2021: 36). As 
readers are no doubt aware, it has always been the poorest in both the global North and 
* Visit: https://stay-grounded.org 
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South who have suffered first and most from crises and climate crisis is no different in this 
regard. For example, in launching its Children’s Climate Risk Index UNICEF reports that 
about 1 billion children live in ‘extremely high-risk countries’ (nearly 50% of children)—
areas exposed to multiple vulnerabilities of drought, heatwaves, flooding etc.* Of these the 
highest ranked countries are mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, though Bangladesh and India 
are also listed (UNICEF, 2021: 14). India is the only one in the top ten carbon emitters and 
the ‘extremely high risk countries’ in combination account for only 9% of annual global 
emissions. 
The degrowth alternative begins from the premise that current development models 
perpetuate structural inequality and we should stop taking from the poor (see Hickel et al., 
2021). As with so much else this may seem like utopia but refusal to countenance something 
is not the same as its impossibility. Universal suffrage seemed absurd in societies built around 
strict hierarchical distinctions rendered as God-given ‘natural order’, and yet eventually 
change came—people struggled and took rights previously denied to them. The first step 
in doing so was thinking differently and understanding that ‘different’ is also feasible (for 
climate-based feasibility argument see, for example, O’Neill et al., 2018). In contrast, 
hanging onto attitudes and practices associated with a necrotic climate profligate civilization 
may turn out to be the real fantasy. 
5. Conclusion: from Crisis to ‘Transversalism’ 
As we stated in the introduction and as our essay title (the phrasing ‘demand’) suggests 
this paper amounts to reasons why a new paradigm is needed rather than a detailed account 
of its content. Again, we suggest you read the special issue papers and other noted sources. 
To conclude, we would note that we are in the midst of a triple crisis of capital, climate, 
and COVID, and their intimate interrelationship, is now apparent to everyone. The existing 
global system, and indeed our present form of civilisation, is entering a period of ‘implosion’ 
(Gills, 2020). 
One thing seems certain, that what ‘we’ i.e., the whole of humanity, do to respond to the 
present accelerating climate emergency and ecological breakdown during the decade of the 
2020s is absolutely pivotal to our future. Our collective actions will largely determine the 
future prospects of humanity for centuries to come. The ‘radical urgency of now’, is here. 
* Visit: https://data.unicef.org/resources/childrens-climate-risk-index-report/ 
“While the pandemic will eventually end, responses to it have 
created a precedent. Dramatic action is now urgently needed 
by all—from governments, financial entities, corporations, 
communities, households, and individuals. We need to believe 
‘deep restoration’ is possible and we need to act like it is possible.”
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An ‘age of adaptation’ looms, and an era of ‘the politics of tipping points’ will ensue (Lewis, 
2021). We urgently need transformational change, across myriad processes and behaviours, 
at all levels from the individual, to the national, regional, and global. We need to redefine 
and transform our way of life. Politics and policy in the coming decades will be compelled to 
debate and organise sweeping adaptations and mitigation, as the progress of the global climate 
crisis increasingly threatens our existing infrastructure, built environment, and food system 
with increasingly rapid obsolescence. How will we provide cabling for power infrastructure 
and surfaces for roads in periodic melting temperatures, how will we maintain crop yields in 
the face of pervasive unpredictable flooding combined with heatwaves and drought (Quiggin 
et al., 2021)? As global heating increases, our existing infrastructure, built environment, and 
agricultural and forestry systems will be rendered ‘unfit for purpose’ and will become more 
prone to potentially calamitous system failures. We need to redesign our civilisation.
While we need governments to act, and policy coordination through initiatives such as the 
COP process are vital, they are not sufficient and we cannot depend on them. Political pressure 
and grassroots changes from below are just, if not more, important. For this to be achieved 
we need new ways of thinking. ‘Transversalism’ is one possibility. Rather than co-optation:
Transversalism aims at consolidating political coalitions and achieving ideational 
accommodation between social groups… it does not imply uniformity or a 
general theory of social emancipation… [it] consists of the following elements: 
(1) recognition of diversity and difference, (2) dialogue (deliberation across 
differences), (3) systemic self-reflection, (4) intentional openness (intention to 
explore the reality of the Other), (5) critical awareness of the intersectional nature 
of power relations that affects interconnections, and finally (6) commitment to 
creating alterity through hybridization and creolization of ideas and actions. 
(Gills and Hossieni, 2021) 
‘We are living in a time of exception. A time when the existing order is open to question’ 
(Gills, 2020: 577). The triple conjuncture of climate change and ecological breakdown, 
global pandemic, and neoliberal economic globalization speak to a Great Implosion, and 
while the pandemic will eventually end, responses to it have created a precedent. Dramatic 
action is now urgently needed by all—from governments, financial entities, corporations, 
communities, households, and individuals. We need to believe ‘deep restoration’ is possible 
and we need to act like it is possible. Maybe this is wishful thinking, but without it our 
nightmares may become realities.    
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